Abstract. In the 1990s, Richard Lewontin referred to what appeared to be the twilight of determinism in biology. He pointed out that DNA determines only a little part of life phenomena, which are very complex. In fact, organisms determine the environment and vice versa in a nonlinear way. Very recently, biophysicists, Shimon Marom and Erez Braun, have demonstrated that controlled biophysical systems have shown a relative autonomy and flexibility in response which could not be predicted. Within the boundaries of some restraints, most of them genetic, this freedom from determinism is well maintained. Marom and Braun have challenged not only biophysical determinism but also reverse-engineering, naive reductionism, mechanism, and systems biology.
exist and which is fully deterministic, but only in the noumenal-the morally rational realm-in which we are free not to follow our emotions and instincts but only the moral, absolute law whose legislator is solely our reason. In contrast, according to Spinoza-who completely excluded the possibility of free will-contingency is only a matter of our ignorance; whenever we know the causes that are relevant to any change, we know for sure, quite adequately, that it does not happen contingently.
Many believed that each of the natural sciences demonstrates that empirical reality, perhaps the only reality in which we can live, is deterministic, as nothing happens contingently, as everything is subject to strict causality (quantum mechanics makes no exception). This holds true not only for all physical, chemical, and biological ordinary phenomena but also for chaotic ones. Chaotic phenomena-those phenomena whose equilibrium is extremely sensitive to the tiniest difference in the initial conditions and hence is unstable-are subject to mathematical equations.
Thus, even though we cannot make weather forecasts for a long period but only for the next three or four days, any weather prediction is subject to simple mathematical equations. Hence, such chaotic phenomena are deterministic.
One can agree that when astronomical phenomena are concerned, determinism appears to have quite a solid ground (some will doubt even this). However, what about biology? Is life, its very existence, subject to determinism, even subject to it at all? Think of Darwinism-there are evolutionary laws but all evolutionary changes cannot escape the contingency of circumstances that are not biological, genetically or otherwise. Nevertheless, also in this case, one can take a Spinozistic stance and argue that all this "contingency" is nothing but our ignorance about these circumstances in which, too, nothing happens contingently.
Though panenmentalist metaphysics leaves necessity only to the realm of individual pure possibility, actual-physical reality is contingent only, even though any actuality is an incomplete actualization of an individual pure possibility (see Gilead's panenmentalist publications mentioned above). For a clarifying analogy, think of purely mathematical entities. These entities or objects yield to a strict logico-mathematical necessity, which is a priori, and, yet, the case appears to be that these entities or objects and their necessary relations are actualized contingently only as physical actualities. Nothing could enforce them as necessary on actual reality. May we demonstrate this to be the case in biological phenomena, too? Is such the case in these phenomena not because of our ignorance but because it is so in fact, quite independent of our knowledge?
In the 1990s, discussing biological phenomena, Richard Lewontin (1995 and 2000) argued that their major parts did not yield to determinism, especially those associated with genetics. Life phenomena are most complex, and genetics plays a role in them but not a crucial or major one. The interrelations between any organism and its environment are even more critical. Lewontin writes:
Even the organism does not compute itself from its DNA. A living organism at any moment in its life is the unique consequence of a development history that results from the interaction of and determination by internal and external forces. . . . Organisms do not find the world in which they develop. They make it. . . . Nor is "internal" identical with "genetic". . . . The variation between sides is a consequence of random cellular movements and chance molecular events within cells during development, so-called "developmental noise". It is this same developmental noise that accounts for the fact that identical twins have different fingerprints and that the fingerprints on our left and right hands are different. . . . The scientists writing about the Genome Project explicitly reject an absolute genetic determinism, but they seem to be writing more to acknowledge theoretical possibilities than out of conviction. . . . we cannot really believe that the sequence of the human genome is the grail that will reveal to us what it is to be human. (Lewontin 1995, pp. 61-62; cf. 2000, p. 120) Following the knowable and wise advice of Lewontin, biology should not dispense of contingency, unpredictability, and indeterminism-all which are inevitable for knowing and understanding biology as it really is.
What really matters, according to such a view, is the flexibility to operate without a "program"; it is the capability of accommodating unforeseen challenges (to use Braun's phrase for it).
Indeed, two biophysicists, Shimon Marom and Erez Braun from the Technion at Haifa, Israel, have clearly demonstrated that a population of microorganisms (such as yeast) and a population of neurons are not subject to determinism, let alone to a strict one; instead, such populations demonstrate degrees of spontaneity and freedom which are unpredictable in two senses-reversible and progressive (Braun and Marom 2015; Braun 2015 (Gilead 1999) while writing the second panenmentalist book (Gilead 2003, see pp. 65-70) . Not before 2012, did Gilead discover the second application, that of the quasicrystals, to which an exclusion of vital crystalline pure possibilities had preceded by Pauling and his many followers. Gilead discovered this major and most interesting application 5 Cf. "every cell has the potential to adapt via multiple heterogeneous processes" (op.cit. p. 40) and "The point in cancer is that in the context of the adult organism, initiating stemness and novel trajectories of differentiation may lead to disastrous consequences in an inappropriate context while in the evolutionary context it serves as a potential for innovation and facilitates evolvability" (op. cit., p. 41). In each of these cases, saving possibilities-a panenmentalist credo and the title of the first panenmentalist book (Gilead 1999 )-plays in fact a major role.
only after the publication of his fourth panenmentalist book (in 2011).
The same holds for some other revolutionary discoveries in chemistry, physics, and biology to which he devoted some of his papers. The same holds true for the findings of Marom and Braun, to which he has become familiar only very recently.
How is it possible that a metaphysician, a philosopher who relies The following is a crucially important passage:
. . . protein fluctuations do not reflect any specific molecular or cellular mechanism, and suggest that some buffering process masks these details and induces universality . . . In the neural system, the same feature is manifested in long-term single neuron and neuronal population excitability dynamics, which are unstable and dominated by critical fluctuations, intermittency, scale-invariant rate statistics, and long memory processes. . . . Physics teaches us that such broad, universal distributions that emerge in different systems and scales, require either fine tuning of control parameters 'engineered' to lock the system in specific (but rare) points in phase space (this is then a critical point), or a capacity of the system to tune itself to hover around such a point, irrespective of control parameters (a process coined self-organized criticality). (Braun and Marom 2015, p. 3) Referring to a capacity of the system to tune itself to hover around such a critical point is a new, overwhelming voice in biophysics.
Mechanisticness, computabilism, functionalism, and most notably determinism, ignoring the inter-relationality of complex systems and environment, should not be considered from now on as suitable or adequate in order to learn and understand such biophysical systems.
Indeed, thanks to Marom and Braun's novel view, "the path towards
complexity is wide open" (ibid.). Hence, it turns out that the microorganism system can adapt to unforeseen challenges within a few generations, practically instantaneous in evolution terms; moreover, the rapidly emerging adapted state is stably inherited . . . This is analogous to the facts of fast learning and memory in humans and other organisms, attributed to whole brain mechanisms. Such rapid adaptations, learning and memory that seemingly break efficacy limits imposed by the dimensionality of the problems, are also observed in our large-scale neuronal networks. . . . The above examples of microscopic-macroscopic degeneracy of observables led us, in Konstanz, to reflect on the possible indeterminacy entailed by the combination of many-to-one and one-to-many relations among levels of organization: Regardless of the level one chooses to analyze, the extent to which observables from that analyzed level determine the phenomenology at other levels, seems limited. We suspect that one possible origin of the above microscopic-macroscopic degeneracy is related to our (experimentalists) habitual isolation of parts from the whole in standard experimental praxis. Biological systems under natural conditions are embedded in environments, which are in themselves dynamical entities that mould the-and are coupled to-many levels of system organization, from the single cell to the whole organism and population of organisms. Disconnecting the system's dynamics from the dynamics or statistics of the environment, might lead to erroneous classification of system's phenomena. A demonstration of the latter point involves the interpretation of neuronal response variability under different environmental statistics. . . . While the exposure of universals is a most significant aspect of biological research (e.g. DNA, cell structure, energy production and consumption, etc.), much of biology is about specificity, telling the origins of differences between species, phenomena, and capacities. . The time is ripe to relinquish in some natural sciences, such as biology, the deterministic nature that Kant and Laplace ascribed to all natural phenomena. If such is the case in biophysics, all the more so is the case in biology in general. At least in biology in general and brain studies in particular, despite the prevailing of main stream reverse engineering, functionalism, computabilism, and mechanism, 6 the twilight of determinism begins to raise its much promising head.
A good philosophy of science should be an analytical and detailed reflection on scientific novelties, discoveries, and progress; it should never take upon itself the task of a mentor, compass, or regulator. Such is the manner that suits religious tendencies or, worse, politically totalitarian, not of a genuine, good philosophy. It is about time to liberate our ideas of natural science from such a dogmatism that such group of philosophers of science in Konstanz have, most unfortunately, demonstrated. Indeed, "the multitude of possible mappings exposes the inherent difficulty of reverse engineering -that is, its indeterminacy" (op.
cit., p.4), as complexity is indispensable for biology; complexity is the special nature of biological systems.
Molecular biology, with the grand ambitions of James Watson and Francis Crick, has followed the wrong approach that all the biological phenomena lay on the basis of the DNA structure and its ramifications.
This has turned out to be a fantasy, and a very misleading one. Braun and Marom offer biologists a paradigm-change, a revolution in theoretical 6 Indeed, "unlike technology, the business of biology as a basic science is not to uncover a plausible mechanism but rather to discover the actual design principles underlying the natural phenomenon; this is where the naive version of reverse engineering in particular, and naive reductionism in general, epistemically fails" (op. cit., p. 4). This is a firm philosophical reflection and not only a wise natural scientific guideline.
biology. It is very sad to realize that of all scholars some philosophers are entirely blind to this promising and welcome novel, even revolutionary, shift.
I would like to end this paper by citing the most important following promising hope:
Notwithstanding the impressive advance in molecular biology, the last 50 years have taught us that progress in understanding biology, which is not synonymous with progress in medical applications, is severely impeded by the reductionist approach, focusing solely on cataloguing an ever increasing list of molecular processes, without a complementary effort in unraveling the system-level organization principles. What seems to be missing is indeed a unifying concept of organization. . . . The current multi-disciplinary effort is still on, so it might be too early to judge. However, until now it has not yet developed an original view, raising its own voice regarding the origin, evolution and development of biological systems as natural phenomena, independent of the tyranny of the molecular approach. (Braun 2015, p. 45) As a philosopher and metaphysician, I whole-heartedly welcome this hope. I look forward to witnessing "a shift in conceptual thinking from molecular causations to a problem of organization" (Braun 2015, p.38) . to follow a reductionistic approach and the old-fashioned tyranny of the 7 Cf. the "paradigm shift" in the study of cancer: "putting the environment context and history of the cells at central stage while moving genes backstage" (Braun 2015, p. 39) ; "a shift from the somatic mutation picture to developmental-organizational perspective" (op.cit., p. 40). It is very interesting and enlightening to compare this conception cancer with that of Aktipis et al. 2015. molecular approach in biology. It is about time to reconsider to what extent, if at all, determinism is valid at least for the biosciences.
